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Les trajectoires des méga-fournisseurs français durant la période modulaire: quelques 
faits empiriques sur Faurecia, Valeo et Plastic Omnium 
Résumé 
Le mouvement de désintégration verticale amorcé dans l’automobile de manière massive 
dans  les  années  1980  s’est  soldé  par  la  constitution  de  méga-fournisseurs  qui  réalisent 
l’essentiel des productions au premier rang de la pyramide d’approvisionnement. Ce texte 
entend apporter des éléments empiriques sur le développement des principaux fournisseurs 
français. Après avoir mis en avant le rôle des constructeurs dans l’émergence de ces méga-
fournisseurs à partir de la moitié des années 1980, nous resituons les fournisseurs français 
parmi les 100 plus importants fournisseurs mondiaux. A partir de la section 3, nous nous 
focalisons sur les trois principaux fournisseurs modulaires dont nous étudions la croissance et 
ses sources, la rentabilité et l’internationalisation. Les éléments empiriques rassemblés ici 
mettent à jour un travail antérieur (Frigant, 2009) et alimentent la thèse d’une co-évolution 
entre  l’architecture  organisationnelle  des  chaînes  d’approvisionnement  et  l’architecture 
industrielle desdites chaînes. 
Mots-clés : modularité, architecture industrielle, automobile, chaîne de valeur, Faurecia, 
Valeo, Plastic Omnium.  
 
French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era: some evidences on Faurecia, 
Valeo and Plastic Omnium 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to present factual elements concerning the rise (decline) of 
French mega-suppliers. The study will focus on France’s three main mega-suppliers, all actors 
that have had a stake in carmakers’ modularisation strategies: Faurecia, Plastic Omnium and 
Valeo. Section 1 returns to the late 1980s and shows that the emergence of today’s mega-
suppliers is rooted in this era and was piloted by French carmakers. Section 2 positions 
French  mega-suppliers  in  a  global  hierarchy  and  distinguishes  between  two  varieties: 
suppliers of simple parts; and module suppliers, with the latter constituting the focus for the 
rest of this text. Section 3 shows how module suppliers’ rise is rooted in their aggressive 
mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  strategies.  It  also  demonstrates  differences  between 
suppliers in terms of the two leading acquisition strategies that were observed. Section 4 
explains why these companies’ profitability continues to disappoint, developing the idea that 
modular strategies imply a big rise in fixed costs, something that suppliers cannot knock onto 
sales prices. Finally, section 5 returns to companies’ internationalisation strategies and offers 
a typology for the different entities that mega-suppliers consolidate 
Keywords: modularity, supply chain, industrial architecture, automobile. 
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Towards  the  late  1980s,  Western  carmakers  embarked  upon  a  vast  vertical  disintegration 
trajectory. The first signs had been given in the 1970s but the movement only really began to amplify 
when the actors in question started trying to imitate organisational practices commonly associated 
with the so-called Japanese model (Lamming 1993; Helper, Sako, 1995; Sako, Helper, 1999; Boyer et 
al., 1998). 
Externalisation processes are characterised by two intrinsically related aspects that we will try 
to dissociate so as to improve the analysis thereof. The first pertains to the organisation of vertical 
relationships and refers to the way in which companies coordinate with one another. Economic 
analysis often emphasizes such aspects since it deals with questions that are very meaningful for this 
academic  discipline,  including  forms  of  governance,  alternatives  between  market  and  hierarchy. 
Williamson’s  study  (1985)  on  governance  structures  offers  a  dramatic  example  of  this  type  of 
research. Coordination issues also raise a number of salient questions that we will be looking to 
mobilise,  relating  to  theoretical  representations  of  the  firm  (Helper,  MacDuffie,  Sabel,  2000).  A 
second  aspect  is  the  industrial  architecture  of  the  supply  chain.  In  our  vocabulary,  industrial 
architecture indicates the structural characteristics of firms and the strategies they deploy. It also 
refers to the way in which different levels of a supply chain mesh with one another. It should be 
repeated that both of these aspects are interlinked yet merit separate analysis. 
The text intends to provide evidence concerning the restructuring of the French automotive 
supply chain’s industrial architecture. It offers empirical elements about the way in which leading 
French suppliers restructured their operations in the wake of a generalised move towards vertical 
disintegration. The analytical usefulness of this study resides in its postulate that understanding 
changes in the functioning of vertical inter-firm relationships requires an understanding of supplier 
strategies.  In  turn,  understanding  changes  in  organisational  architecture  implies  understanding 
changes in industrial architecture. Indeed, it is often written that suppliers and subcontractors have 
had to adapt in response to carmakers’ new demands. This is not untrue but it does constitute a top-
down analysis that we find insufficient - which is not to say that we are advocating an overly passive 
analysis  ourselves.  After  all,  suppliers  are  also  proactive  and  contribute  actively  through  their 
industrial strategies to the forging of new supply chain organisations. Thus, many suppliers have 
anticipated certain modularity trends and used their innovation capabilities to resolve several of the 
problems that carmakers face. By so doing, they have transposed the notion of modularity to the 
automotive sphere. After all, the automobile remains a deeply systemic product (Clark, Fujimoto, 
1991; Takeishi, Fujimoto, 2003), meaning that the concept of modularisation can only be transferred 
to this sphere via the intermediary of macro-components (Volpato, 2004) if large suppliers play an 
active role (Sako, 2003; Fourcade, Midler, 2005).  
One key characteristic of the current era is the advent of mega-suppliers. These are firms that 
were able to transform themselves in a way that allowed them to occupy the first tier of the supply 
pyramid (Frigant, 2009; Klier, Rubenstein, 2008). Clearly, the OEM market is not totally controlled by 
such mega-suppliers. They are dominant firms but alongside of them there still exists a whole fabric 
of SMEs with direct access to carmakers (Herrigel, 2010). The supply pyramid has less of the Egyptian 
form that is commonly represented, and probably more of an Aztec form that is less hierarchical than 
generally believed and much less static in terms of the way different tiers are structured - with some 
SMEs retaining a possibility of becoming first tier suppliers themselves (Frigant, 2011). All in all, there 
is no doubt that these actors have an important role to play. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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The purpose of this paper is to present factual elements concerning the rise of French mega-
suppliers. The study will focus on France’s three main mega-suppliers, all actors that have had a stake 
in carmakers’ modularisation strategies: Faurecia, Plastic Omnium and Valeo. This is essentially an 
empirical study that will try to update a 2009 study and apply it to French suppliers. The former study 
will be mobilised on occasion to position the French suppliers within a more global context. Most of 
the data produced covers recent years (2009 and/or 2010, or even 2011 for production sites - section 
6) enabling the study to also account for the severe crisis from which Tier 1 suppliers suffered in 
2008/2009. 
From a methodological perspective, the text is mainly based on analysis of annual reports 
produced by companies that we have been studying for years. It is also supplemented by studies of 
the business press and by ad hoc interviews. Lastly, data provided by Automotive News will be used 
to account for OEM sales to carmakers. 
Section 1 returns to the late 1980s and shows that the emergence of today’s mega-suppliers is 
rooted in this era and was piloted by French carmakers. Section 2 positions French mega-suppliers in 
a global hierarchy and distinguishes between two varieties: suppliers of simple parts; and module 
suppliers, with the latter constituting the focus for the rest of this text. Section 3 shows how module 
suppliers’  rise  is  rooted  in  their  aggressive  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  strategies.  It  also 
demonstrates differences between suppliers in terms of the two leading acquisition strategies that 
were  observed.  Section  4  explains  why  these  companies’  profitability  continues  to  disappoint, 
developing the idea that modular strategies imply a big rise in fixed costs, something that suppliers 
cannot knock onto sales prices. Finally, section 5 returns to companies’ internationalisation strategies 
and  offers  a  typology  for  the  different  entities  that  mega-suppliers  consolidate.  To  sustain  this 
typology, we produce factual data on staff numbers  and entities for suppliers such as Faurecia, 
Plastic Omnium and Valeo. 
1. 1980/1990s: French carmakers’ help in developing supportive 
suppliers 
Today’s mega-suppliers took a long time to emerge. Their rise is the result of a long transition, 
particularly in Europe. As explained by T. Fujimoto (1999), the Japanese pyramid architecture had 
already enabled the advent of suppliers imbued with a capacity for development and more extensive 
competencies than those found in Europe. Japanese suppliers’ greater structuring allows them to 
adapt better to changes resulting from the different forms of externalisation that arose in the 1990s. 
At more of an upstream level, however, this appeared to be a corollary of the Japanese pyramid 
architecture. Once Western carmakers decided to go down the path of vertical disintegration, they 
had to be sure that they possessed the requisite suppliers’ fabric. The problem is that companies of 
this  sort  were  almost  non-existent  in  Europe.  The  Fordian  subcontracting  model  caused 
subcontractors  to  atrophy  (Chanaron,  1995).  This  is  because  the  economic  and  technological 
domination linked to this subcontracting model was incompatible with the development of suppliers 
endowed with significant tangible and intangible resources. 
According to L. Laigle (1996), it was after 1985 that French carmakers decided to fully commit 
to  restructuring  their  suppliers.  The  aim  here  was  both  to  modify  procurement  practices  and 
restructure  the  suppliers  themselves.  Towards  this  end,  Peugeot  and  Renaults  implemented 
performance  criteria  that  worked  both  as  objectives  and  standards.  They  were  objectives  for 
suppliers  in  the  sense  that  these  actors  now  had  targets  to  reach  and  needed  to  establish  an 
organisation to do this. They were standards since the carmakers announced that over time, only 
suppliers that satisfied their demands could work with them. Criteria pertaining to issues such as 
“quality; equipment’s technical performance of (safety, reliability, durability, etc.); delivery and stock French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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management  times;  productivity;  delivery  of  pre-assembled  functions;  and  innovativeness  of 
functional sub-assemblies” (Laigle, 1996, p.221). 
One  symbol  of  Peugeot  and  Renault’s  takeover  of  the  supply  chain  organisation  was  the 
creation  of  a  common  standard  in  1987 called  “Supplier  Insurance  Quality”  (Assurance  Qualité 
Fournisseur, or AQF). 
 
“This standard includes supplier selection criteria (ordered by priority) helping to rank suppliers 
in a grid reflecting their progress and quality levels; the value of the executive team; price 
competitiveness; ability to export products or to work for foreign carmakers (notably Japanese 
transplants);  ability  to  deliver  just-in-time  and  ensure  the  technical  development  of  new 
equipment - and more recently, whether they can manage complete functional systems and set 
up operations abroad; participate in co-development; and work by price objectives” (criteria 
that Renault added in 1993) (Laigle, 1996, p.221). 
The advent of these standards was supplemented by the implementation of a dual control and 
assistance  system.  Carmakers  created  management  tools  that  would  serve  as  operational 
instruments implementing the aforementioned standards. On one hand, these tools helped to audit 
supplies  and  verify  whether  they  met  the  established  objectives.  On  the  other,  suppliers 
appropriated these tools and used them to reorganise themselves and ensure that their factories and 
organisations fit the new system. In certain cases, carmakers seconded personnel to suppliers to 
guide them in their modernisation drive. 
This normalisation process did not benefit all suppliers (and actually discriminated against 
some).  On  one  hand,  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  high  potential  suppliers  capable  of 
responding to the new demands vs. others to be excluded from carmaker shortlists. Things would not 
change too quickly over the short run because contracts cannot be terminate right away and because 
it takes time to replace a supplier considered insufficient. However, the direction of travel was given. 
Later, this period would appear as an era of supplier selection. After all, it was at this point that 
carmakers sewed the seeds for future mega-suppliers.  
In a similar vein, research from this era narrates the different strategies that suppliers adopted 
in response – strategies that would ultimately determine their supply-chain positioning.  
Lamming (1993) has come up with long details of suppliers’ emergence strategies, identifying 
four different categories: 1) leader key players with a strong automobile specialisation and whose 
objective was to become first tier suppliers with major automobile-specific R&D activities 2) follower 
key players comprised of large companies for whom the automobile was one product in a broader 
portfolio; 3) loyal collaborator leaders who would develop production and innovation capabilities 
working closely together with their main carmaker; and 4) loyal collaborator followers who seemed 
destined to slip to the bottom of the pyramid. The strategies may have differed but the consequence 
was always to divide suppliers’ roles between those who were destined to occupy the carmaker’s 
first tier versus others whose destiny was to be relegated to the second or even third tier. 
At the supply chain’s first tier, adaptation strategies were notably be comprised of corporate 
concentrations. From the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, the world witnessed a whole host of 
M&A operations and company divestments, all in a bid to develop coherent productive entities. It 
remains that most of these operations were run on a domestic scale, with the main purpose being to 
take units with which carmakers were familiar and recombine them in larger entities. Indeed, in 
some cases carmakers played an advisory (and even matchmaking) role. Moreover, by reselling a 
particular subsidiary to particular supplier, they were also helping to forge future mega-suppliers. 
One example is when Renault resold seating manufacturer Sotexo to Bertrand-Faure, spawning what French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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later became Faurecia. Renault also helped future leading equipment suppliers such as Siemens 
(through the sale of Renix) or Hayes (resale of FASS foundry). It was this period that paved the way 
for mega-suppliers. 
2. French mega-suppliers’ position in the global ranking 
In the late 1990s, the pyramid architecture became highly structured with actors seemingly 
struggling to progress towards further externalisation (or more prosaically, to tighten the top of the 
pyramid). This is because progress in this direction implied an ability to reach a higher level of the 
component aggregation process. Relevant solutions were rooted in modular production, which in the 
automotive sector involved breaking the modularity concept down into macro-components (Volpato, 
2004). It remains that much like the pyramid architecture was constructed on the basis that suppliers 
could provide sufficient output, transitioning to macro-components assumed the existence of actors 
capable of playing this role. It is this status that the mega-suppliers would come to occupy. 
The rise of mega-suppliers thoroughly changed the landscape for the world’s leading suppliers. 
Table 1 uses Automotive News rankings to portray a number of major shifts. Firstly, note the decline 
of American suppliers, replaced by their Asian counterparts. Whereas this category had accounted 
for nearly half of the world’s 50 top suppliers and 43% of its 100 leaders in 1999, by 2009 Americans 
accounted for only 24% of the top 50 and 27% of the top 100. This downgrading is mainly explained 
by the rise of Asian suppliers, notably Japanese. This latter group accounted for 18% of the top 50 
and 16% of the top 100 in 1999 - figures that rose respectively to 42% and 34% within a decade. 
Table 1 – Nationality of the TOP 50 and TOP 100 world auto suppliers 
       TOP 50   TOP 100 
    1999  2005  2008  2009  1999  2005  2008  2009 
USA   23  16  13  12  43  28  29  27 
Canada   1  1  1  1  4  2  2  2  North America 
Mexico  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1 
South Korea   0  1  2  2  0  2  4  4 
Asia 
Japan   9  16  17  19  16  26  25  30 
Other European 
countries 
0  0  0  0  2  3  4  3 
Spain   0  0  0  0   0  1  2  2 
UK   2  1  1  0  6  4  2  2 
Italy  1  1  1  1  1  2  1  1 
Sweden   1  1  1  1  2  3  1  3 
France   5  3  3  3  8  7  5  6 
Europe 
Germany   8  10  11  11  17  21  24  19 
Source: Author from Automotive News data 
In general, America’s decline did not benefit Europe, since the percentage of suppliers present 
in both rankings remains identical over the decade in question. The European continent was the 
theatre  of  some  major  disparities,  however.  Firstly,  the  displacement  of  automakers  to  Eastern 
Europe was not accompanied by the rise of local suppliers (with European countries’ weight having 
evolved very little). Thus, whereas the Czech Republic became Europe’s main producer of automotive 
components in relative value and local industrial employment terms, there was no particular creation 
of local companies capable of rivaling with major Western equipment suppliers (Pavlínek, Ženka, 
2010).  This  was  followed  by  an  observable  decline  or  stabilisation  in  the  older  industrialised 
countries’ position - with one noteworthy exception, to wit, Germany, whose suppliers accounted for 
16% of the Top 50 and 17% of the Top 100 in 1999, versus 22% and 19% respectively 10 years later.  French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Table 2 – French auto suppliers in the Automotive News’ TOP 100 ranking  
1999  2005  2008  2009 
Rank  Enterprise 
Auto 
sales 
Rank  Enterprise 
Auto 
sales 
Rank  Enterprise 
Auto 
sales 
Rank  Enterprise 
Auto 
sales 
10  Valeo  7719  9  Faurecia  14000  8  Faurecia  17656  7  Faurecia  13000 
16  Faurecia  4807  10  Valeo  12200  16  Valeo  10800  13  Valeo  10400 
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(1) Inergy is created in 2000, it’s a 50/50 joint-venture between Solvay Automotive and Plastic Omnium. In 
2010, PO takes full ownership of INERGY after acquiring Solvay's 50% stake 
(2) In 2000, Labinal has been sold in two parts. SNECMA (now Safran) bought the Aircraft division and Valeo 
bought the automobile division.  
(3) In 2000/2001, Faurecia bought the automobile branch of Sommer Allibert, SAI Automotive. 
In  this  vast  reshuffle,  French  suppliers’  performance  was  medium  at  best,  with  two 
interpretations possible for this outcome. Optimistically, it might be said that France was in fact able 
to develop first tier suppliers possessing a global reach. The country’s slight decline in terms of 
companies featuring in the Automotive News rankings can be explained by mergers between French 
suppliers and is something that was compensated by strong growth in the number of companies 
represented overseas (see above). More pessimistically, it might be said that in contrast to Germany, 
France was unable to spawn new companies powerful enough to feature in these rankings. Without 
being adamant, the second interpretation seems more accurate to us. 
Along these lines, questions must be raised about French automakers’ role during the era 
when  mega-suppliers  were  being  formed.  We  have  seen  that  they  played  an  active  role  in  the 
preceding  era  through  their  contributions  to  the  selection  of  “future”  first  tier  suppliers.  Our 
interpretation is that French carmakers were not sufficiently interested to spawn top-level suppliers 
during  the  modular  era.  Afterwards,  they  seemed  to  feel  that  competition  should  prevail.  Our 
explanation for this behavior is that carmakers felt that they already had enough potential actors 
playing a first tier suppliers role. 
One fact supporting this argument is the remarkably strong presence of non-French companies 
in  the  fabric  of  French  suppliers.  Different  studies  undertaken  by  France’s  Ministry  for  Industry 
demonstrate that since the first rationalisation efforts in the mid-1980s, France has attracted quite a 
few foreign suppliers. Using a narrow definition of the supply industry, the Ministry has estimated 
that foreign groups employed two-thirds of all automotive supply sector employees in 2007. The 
foreign  companies  in  question  mainly  came  from  the  US  or  Germany.  From  the  carmakers’ 
perspective, there was no need to promote national companies to a mega-supplier status given that 
the opening of borders already allowed foreign actors occupy this space. The contrast with the 
German and Japanese economies is noteworthy at this level. Indeed, following different mechanisms, 
carmakers from the latter two countries relied on traditional suppliers, helping them to restructure French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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and internationalise. Takeishi and Noro’s data (2007) on Japanese carmakers has shown that their 
dependency on kereitsu members persisted, despite falling somewhat over the years. 
Another reason resides in the very strong growth of France’s two leaders, Valeo and Faurecia, 
who have bought a lot of their domestic competitors that were for sale. The status of a national 
champion is essential in the French business context and has once again been verified. The two 
companies’ desire to achieve a certain level of consolidation helped to impede the emergence of 
other,  more  specialist  industrial  actors.  This  explains  the  disappearance  of  Sommer-Allibert  and 
Labinal from the Automotive News rankings following their acquisition by Faurecia and Valeo (see 
notes for Table 2). Conversely, whenever these two companies abandoned a given automotive sub-
sector, this would allow the emergence of reasonably sized suppliers (Plastic Omnium) and/or the 
survival of existing firms: Michelin for tires; Saint-Gobain Sekurit for glass products; and Hutchinson 
for very high-tech products and components such as sealing systems, fluid transfer systems, vibration 
and acoustic insulation or transmission systems.  
3. Mega-suppliers’ acquisition-driven growth 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal a small number of French mega-suppliers. Two profiles co-exist at this 
level.  
Firstly, there were the historic automotive companies that produced basic parts. Note that this 
is not synonymous with simple parts since such components are all subject to real innovation efforts. 
Examples include glassmaker Saint-Gobain Sekurit and tires manufacturer Michelin. Like their foreign 
counterparts, these two companies tended to descend the rankings, translating the reshuffling of the 
OEM market around the complex sub-assemblies that, by definition, they did not produce. Note that 
for a certain period of time, Michelin had the ambition of powering up its production of complete 
ground contact systems. This would have imitated the things that its German competitor Continental 
was doing via its ContiTech subsidiary. In the end, Michelin dropped most of these ambitions, if only 
temporarily - with its Active Wheel project (involving attraction systems inserted directly into a car’s 
wheelbase) remaining on the back burner, like the company’s electric vehicle activities.  
Secondly, there were the manufacturers of complex sub-assemblies and modules: Faurecia, 
Plastic Omnium and Valeo (see Frame 1). These are the module suppliers that grew the most since 
the late 1990s. This is because the vertical disintegration during what we might call the modular era 
encouraged growth in this particular market. The three module suppliers who still featured in the 
2009 rankings have regularly reaffirmed in their narratives a desire to build up their offer of modules. 
Moreover, analysis of post-2000 strategic discourses of executives from these companies indicates 
that they justified their strategic choices through this modular logic - whether this involved choices 
made in regards to internal organisational structures; external alliances; mergers/acquisitions; or 
divestments from certain activities. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Frame 1 – Main business divisions of French modular-suppliers 
Faurecia 
1) Automotive Seating 
2) Emissions Control Technologies 
3) Automotive Exteriors:  
· front ends including engine cooling systems- 
· Exterior systems (bumpers, design elements...) 
· Shock absorption systems) 
4) Interior Systems (instrument panels, center consoles, door panels and door modules, and acoustic modules). 
Valeo 
1) Powertrain Systems:  
· Electrical Systems 
· Transmission Systems 
· Engine Management Systems 
· Air Management Systems 
· Hybrid and Electric Vehicle Systems 
2) Thermal Systems  
· Climate Control 
· Powertrain Thermal Systems 
· Compressors 
· Front-End Modules. 
3) Comfort and Driving Assistance Systems  
· Driving Assistance 
· Interior Controls 
· Interior Electronics 
· Access Mechanisms 
4) Visibility Systems 
· Lighting Systems 
· Wiper Systems 
· Wiper Motors 
Plastic Omnium Automobile
(*) 
1) PO Auto Exterior: body components and modules 
2) Inergy Automotive Systems: fuel systems (full stake since 2010) 
(*) Plastic Omnium has two divisions PO Automobile (sales 2010: 2778.0M€) and PO Environnement (sales 2010: 
471.6M€) 
There  are  many  examples  of  such  disengagements  and  there  is  no  reason  to  attempt  an 
exhaustive survey when a few illustrative strategies suffice. In 2007, Valeo announced the sale of its 
entire cables division to German supplier Leoni for €255 million (a division employing 11,700 persons 
in 12 plants, including nine in low-cost countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Romania and Slovakia). 
The sale of this historic group division is a good illustration of the refocusing strategies pursued by 
mega-suppliers concerned with offering increasingly complex sub-assemblies that could potentially 
produce greater value-added. At the time, the operation’s aims were presented as refocusing the 
company on its core business of providing modules. Long before this, Faurecia had already adopted a 
similar refocusing strategy by selling other historic group activities: its steering wheel operations in 
1999; and Peugeot Motorcycles and Delsey, both in 1998. 
The disengagement from certain economic activities was accompanied by the acquisition of 
many others. Faurecia was a singularly active in this regard. Note that the company itself derived 
from a 1999 merger between two leading French suppliers: Bertrand Faure and ECIA, a subsidiary of French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Peugeot.  Contrary  to  Valeo  and  Plastic  Omnium,  which  had  a  long  industrial  history  and  was 
constituted via organic growth and a few (relatively) smaller external acquisitions. All in all, Faurecia’s 
emphasis was on major acquisitions.  
In sum, the acquisition strategies pursued by the three companies obeyed two kinds of logic. 
·  Acquisition of new competencies and penetration of new areas of activity. The goal here was to 
acquire  corporate  divisions  endowed  with  complementary  competencies  enabling  the 
production  of  modules.  At  a  time  when  producers  were  structuring  their  module  products, 
another aim was to restructure traditional components divisions in such a way as to create new 
areas  of  activity  focused  on  a  modules  orientation.  With  this  in  mind,  the  creation  of  joint 
ventures  seemed  like  an  alternative  solution  capable  of  federating  competencies  between 
industrialists and allowing companies to embark upon a modular trajectory but with lower sunk 
costs. In the early 2000s, for instance, Valeo was particularly active along these lines. In the year 
2000 alone, the company started a front modules cooperation with Plastic Omnium while also 
working with Textron on cockpit modules and with BorgWarner on driving systems. Pursuing the 
same logic (and asides from the aforementioned association with Valeo), Plastic Omnium joined 
with the Belgian company Solvay in 2000 to create a joint venture entitled Inergy that within a 
few short years had built itself into a major actor in the fuel systems market. Similarly, in July 
2004 Plastic Omnium got together with German suppliers Hella and Behr to create HBPO, a front 
modules specialist in which each of the three owners held a one-third share. 
 
In the traditional manner, these joint ventures - which were mainly developed to penetrate new 
markets - would often be purchased after a few short years by one of the founding partners. A 
good example of this trajectory was Inergy’s total consolidation into Plastic Omnium in 2010. 
 
·  Extension of production capacities via acquisition of competitor companies. The idea here was 
to acquire companies positioned in similar markets to take over their customer portfolio. As seen 
above, Faurecia was particular proactive in this arena, notably deploying strategies of this kind in 
the developed countries that it wanted to penetrate. However, its major acquisitions had the 
effect of sharply increasing its financial debt, which rose on an cumulative basis to 19.9% in 2000. 
Following this, Faurecia’s parent company (Peugeot Citroën) had to recapitalise or guarantee its 
recapitalisation on several occasions over the ensuing decade in a bit to cyt debt levels (Figure 1). 
Four major Faurecia operations illustrate this strategy. 
1.  In 1999,Faurecia paid €340 million to buy APAS and enter the US exhaust system market; 
2.  It  considerably  reinforced  its  presence  in  Germany  in  2001  by  acquiring  Sommer-
Allibert’sautomotive components activities there for €1.5 billion; 
3.  It announced the takeover of US company, Emcon Technologies, in November 2009
1; 
4.  In February 2010, it took advantage of Plastal’s liquidation to reinforce its position as Germany 
and Spain at a cost of €49.9 million 
Valeo tended to proceed via “small” acquisitions and around the year 2000 began relying on 
joint ventures to access new markets (Japan, notably). The company also founded Zexel (jointly with 
Bosch in Japan) to work on automatic temperature control; Unisia Jecs (Japan) on transmissions; Iran 
Khodro & Sabco on air-conditioning systems, etc. 
                                                      
1 Emcom Technologies exemplifies the equity activities that have shaken up the automotive supply sector. In 2004, global mega-supplier 
ArvinMeritor sold Emcom to One Equity Partners, an investment fund – this being a category that has raised its strategic profile in recent 
years through frequent acquisitions in the automotive supply sector (Frigant, 2009). Investment funds tend to purchase divisions that 
suppliers want to divest but not sell to the direct rivals. This often results in the funds reselling the divisions to other suppliers seeking to 
acquire competencies or access new markets. Profits from such resales can be substantial, one example being One Equity Partners’ 
purchase of Emcom for something like $310 million before reselling the company at $350 million. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Given its smaller size, Plastic Omnium’s operations were less spectacular. Having acquired 
Inergy as part of its first strategic move, the company notably went on to acquire Inoplast for €6 
million in 2007, using this as a platform to found a new company called IPO (iNo Plastic Omnium) in 
2008 – once again, on a joint venture basis. More recently (May 2011), Plastic Omnium acquired 
Ford’s US fuel tank divisions. Given the company’s smaller size, the proximity of these two major 
operations caused a rapid rise in debt levels. Conversely, Valeo’s prudent attitude concerning major 
acquisitions enabled it to keep its debt levels under control. (Figure 1). 












Source: author from enterprise data 
Table 3 – Evolution of sales 1998-2006 (Group level; 100=1998) 
FTS  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Aisin Seiki  100  97,1  107,0  120,7  130,7  150,6  171,7  195,7  226,9 
ArvinMeritor  100  116,0  134,3  177,4  179,4  203,0  209,4  232,1  239,7 
Autoliv  100  109,3  118,0  114,4  127,4  151,9  176,1  177,9  177,4 
Bosch  100  108,4  122,6  132,2  135,9  141,3  155,5  161,1  169,7 
Bridgestone  100  93,2  89,7  95,4  100,5  103,0  108,0  120,3  133,7 
Continental  100  135,4  150,0  166,6  169,2  171,1  186,8  205,2  220,8 
Dana  100  105,0  98,6  82,2  75,2  63,0  71,7  68,1  67,3 
Delphi  100  102,5  102,3  91,6  96,3  98,7  100,5  94,6  92,7 
Denso  100  107,1  114,6  136,5  132,6  145,7  159,2  181,3  205,2 
Faurecia  100  177,4  243,0  400,0  410,6  421,3  446,1  456,9  484,8 
Freudenberg  100  106,3  122,0  117,7  115,0  113,5  129,7  142,0  148,4 
GKN PLC  100  124,8  138,8  115,5  111,2  112,2  117,2  122,7  122,3 
Johnson Controls  100  128,2  136,3  146,4  159,7  179,9  211,0  218,3  256,1 
Lear  100  137,2  155,3  150,4  159,2  173,8  187,2  188,6  196,9 
Magna  100  155,8  176,6  183,6  216,0  255,5  343,9  379,8  402,6 
Michelin  100  110,2  123,3  126,3  125,3  123,1  125,7  124,9  131,2 
TRW  100  88,7  92,5  85,5  88,0  96,2  101,8  107,1  111,4 
Valeo  100  128,2  151,5  170,0  162,9  153,4  156,8  165,0  165,6 
Visteon  100  105,1  109,6  100,5  103,6  99,4  105,0  95,6  64,3 
ZF Friedrichshafen  100  102,4  121,0  133,8  181,5  176,7  195,9  214,4  230,8 
Source: Frigant, 2009, p.438 
The  goal  but  also  the  consequence  of  these  successive  mergers/acquisitions  was  a 
considerable acceleration in the three groups’ organic growth. Clearly, given the magnitude of these 
operations,  Faurecia’s  growth  appears  spectacular,  whether  in  comparison  with  its  French 
counterparts (Figures 2 & 3) or global mega-suppliers (Table 3). Between 1998 and 2006, Faurecia French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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experienced the fastest growth rate of any of the world’s main suppliers (baseline 2006, Table 3). 
This result, calculated using group level consolidated revenues, is congruent with Automotive News 
rankings of OEM automotive sales, which estimate that Faurecia went from number 16 globally in 
1999 to number seven by 2008. As for Valeo, despite a remarkable 65.6% growth in consolidated 
revenues, the company went from 10 in 1999 to 13 in 2009, with much of this decline explained by 
the sale of its cables activity. 
After experiencing relatively modest growth, Plastic Omnium benefited from later acquisitions 
to ascend the global hierarchy of suppliers. Its revenues grew by 79% between 2004 and 2010 and 
according to the Automotive News, between 1999 and 2009 it rose in the ranking from 77 to 59 
globally (Table 2). Having taken a 100% stake in Inergy in 2010, Plastic Omnium is likely to see 
renewed strong growth in 2011, with higher revenues and further ascension up the Automotive 
News rankings. 
Figures 2 and 3 help to measure the magnitude of the 2008/09 crisis. Faurecia’s growth was 
suddenly interrupted in 2007 by a crisis that began to produce its effects in 2008
2 before worsening 
in 2009. Faurecia’s sales fell by 22.6% between 2008 and 2009 after dropping by 5.7% in 2008. For 
Valeo - which lost revenues and especially jobs after spinning off its labour-intensive cables activity - 
the falloff accelerated in both 2008 (-9.2%) and 2009 (-13.6%). Plastic Omnium was able to maintain 
its year-on-year performance in 2008 (+0.4%) but began to suffer in 2009 when sales fell by 8%. 
Confirming this general statistical trend, France’s three module suppliers began to recover in 2010, 
with  sales rising at Faurecia by 48.5%, Valeo by 28.4% and Plastic Omnuim by 32.2%. Similarly, staff 
numbers started to grow again (Faurecia +29.6%
3, Valeo +11.2%, Plastic Omnium +30.6%) ultimately 
allowing the three suppliers to surpass their pre-crisis levels.  


































































Source: author from enterprise annual reports 
 
                                                      
2 In our statistics, the sharp fall in staff numbers in 2008 is explained by our use of end-of-year figures. This is significant because it was in 
4Q 2008 that carmakers decided upon massive factory shutdowns. 
3 The rise in Faurecia’s staff numbers included its acquisition of Emcom in 2010 (+2,250 employees) and Plastal. All in all, 9,367 employees 
joined the company in 2010 as a result of acquisitions (excluding temporary personnel), totalling an increase of 23.3% in staff numbers or 
plus 5.3% without changing the size of the firm. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Source: author from enterprise annual reports 
4. Pressure on profits 
The larger suppliers were hoping to see an improvement in profits at the beginning of the 
modular  era.  Margins  had  been  squeezed  during  the  Fordist  period  due  to  strong  competitive 
pressure from carmakers. The first era of vertical disintegration – marked by its general narrative 
about the wonders of partnerships - had sparked much hope and even a few concrete achievements. 
This  is  because  carmakers  realised  that  they  had  to  let  suppliers  achieve  sufficient  margins  to 
undertake  the  tangible  and  intangible  investments  necessitated  by  the  growing  delegation  of 
responsibilities. In suppliers’ minds, providing a broader range of modules should have confirmed 
this tendency, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the sub-assemblies in question were complex, with 
suppliers therefore hoping that they could bolster their total margins by aggregating individual mark-
ups on components that had previously been dealt with in isolation. Secondly given the increase in 
market size resulting from actors’ platform policies, they expected to achieve economies of scale and 
above  all  economies  of  scope  in  both  their  R&D  activities  and  production  of  certain  hidden 
components (i.e. ones that did not play a role in the modules’ ultimate differentiation). They also 
hoped that they could sell these components to a number of identical customers. It remains that 
these hopes were never completely fulfilled, for three main reasons. 
4.1. Pressure on prices 
One,  because  the  carmakers  were  relatively  quick  to  perceive  the  profit  opportunities 
associated  with  modularity.  As  a  result,  they  reacted  by  increasing  pressure  on  prices.  French 
carmakers set price targets that were systematically revised downwards whenever car models were 
rejuvenated. Each new module (generally comprised of components) was sold at a lower price than 
its  predecessor.  In  addition,  productivity  gain  targets  lasting  for  the  contract’s  duration  were 
introduced, forcing suppliers to agree to price decrease stipulations (usually on an annual basis) 
supposedly  justified  by  expected  productivity  gains.  These  “progress  contracts”  were  subject  to 
tough negotiations and rarely worked to suppliers’ advantage.  French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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4.2. Increasing competition 
Two,  these  negotiations  were  particularly  disadvantageous  to  suppliers,  whose 
internationalisation strategies intensified overall competition in the sector. This is because suppliers’ 
search for new customers caused them to invest the world’s leading markets, increasing the number 
of potential producers in each of the main automotive spaces. Thus (and as demonstrated above), 
the French market ended up hosting most of the world’s leading equipment manufacturers. As a 
result,  where  situations  of  quasi-monopoly  arose,  carmakers  would  trigger  competition  by  not 
hesitating to source the inputs for their different modules from a range of suppliers.  
4.3. The rise of fixed-cost 
Three, mega-suppliers suffered rapidly rising fixed costs. This was felt at three levels.  
Firstly, R&D expenses rose sharply. Developing a new module became an expensive venture 
for suppliers, who had to conceive the new product in its entirety, designing a module’s architecture 
and developing competencies in its constituent components. Valeo was particularly active over the 
decade and engaged in significant autonomous research (with R&D expenses - after adjustment for 
carmaker  reimbursements  –  hovering  around  5.5% of  revenues  over  this  period)
4.  This  led  to  a 
number of highly publicised innovations that would sustain the brand’s innovative image (Start-Stop 
system, Directional Lighting system, etc.).  


































































Source: author from enterprise data 
Secondly (and recycling vocabulary used in transaction cost economics - Williamson, 1985), 
internal governance costs rose. The straightforward inflation in these cost items (including staff 
numbers,  number of  sites,  product  lines,  etc.)  implied  a  complexification of companies’  internal 
organisation. Moreover, the pyramidisation of the supply chain forced module suppliers to manage 
an  increasing  number  of  suppliers.  This  was  particularly  significant  given  that  the  suppliers  in 
question had to be found in the different spaces where they were located. 
                                                      
4 According to the CIB study, Valeo filed 5,200 initial patents over 1996-2005, ranking second in France (behind Alcatel-Lucent but ahead of 
Renault, L’Oréal and PSA) and tenth in Europe (led by German companies Siemens, Daimler, Bayer and Volkswagen). On a global scale, 
Valeo is among the top 100 most inventive companies, ranking 97th overall in the CIB study (source: Valeo Website) French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Thirdly, the principles of just-in-time delivery coupled with modules’ intrinsic characteristics 
caused  an  expansion  in  the  number  of  production  sites  (Frigant,  Lung,  2002;  Larsson,  2002)
5. 
Automakers also continued to pressure suppliers into delocalising to low-cost countries. Although 
this was denied for a while, it is commonly accepted now that carmakers’ procurement managers 
would  ensure  that  their  supplier  selection  criteria  included  a  quota  for  production  in  low-cost 
countries. This objective would be established mechanistically, to the extent that in certain cases, 
carmakers  would  actively  prefer  (for  reasons  relating  to  this  internal  objective)  a  supplier  with 
operations in a low-cost country – sometimes going as far as to impose a delocalisation strategy on a 
supplier  -  even  if  the  decision’s  economic  viability  was  inconclusive
6.  Public  recognition  of  this 
delocalisation constraint can be found in the measures adopted within the framework of the “Etats 
généraux  de  l’industrie  automobile”
7  that  was  held  in  France,  where  public  sector  actors  and 
equipment suppliers demanded that the “Code of performance and good conduct” drafted on the 
occasion explicitly include an article touching on this topic: 
“The customer [understood here as the carmaker] agrees not to require that any proportion of 
the supplier or subcontractor’s output - or its own purchases -necessarily occur in a low-cost 
country without providing an objective economic justification for this based on actual price. In 
particular, the customer agrees not to apply any criteria specifying a minimum proportion of its 
internal  processes  for  accessing  and  defining  partners’  fixed  and  variable  remuneration.  ” 
(Source: Code of performance and good conduct relating to the customer-supplier relationship 
within the automotive sector, Paris, 9 February 2009, p. 2.) 
By yearend 2006, we estimate that 17.5% of Faurecia employees allocated to the European 
market worked out of peripheral low-cost countries in North Africa and Eastern Europe. As for Valeo, 
24.6% of its European staff members worked out of these countries, which accounted for 20% of its 
total production sites.  
The  sum  total  of  suppliers’  fixed  costs  rose  considerably  due  to  carmakers’  disintegration 
activities. A keen observation by Salerno (2001) states that one important motivation for carmakers’ 
vertical disintegration drive was the desire to transfer their fixed costs to suppliers.  
One response to the strategy adopted by French suppliers consisted of regaining flexibility 
while limiting wage-related fixed costs. To achieve this, suppliers did not hesitate to resort massively 
and increasingly to temporary personnel (see Figure 5). Of course, during the 2008/2009 crisis, such 
employees were the first to be fired, as confirmed in 2008 and to a lesser extent in 2009 by the 
collapse in the number of temporary workers (remember that we are using yearend data).  
                                                      
5 See, next section. 
6 The same behaviour can be observed in Germany: “[…] OEMs [carmakers] call on their suppliers to increase low cost sourcing and to 
make  use  of  second  and  third  tier  suppliers  from  Central  Eastern  European  countries.  To  some  extent,  OEMs  impose  precise  LCC 
procurement quotas on their suppliers, forcing them to relocate even though the required priced reductions could also be achieved by 
introducing innovative forms of work at home (Jürgens, Blöcker, Hildermeier, 2010, p.53). 
7 The “General automotive conference” was a French government initiative aimed at relaunching the country’s industrial policy in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. It materialised through a widespread consultation of companies (mainly) that were sometimes structured 
by branches. The automotive supply chain was involved in this exercise and adopted the code of good conduct to which we refer in the 
text. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Source: author from enterprise annual reports 
In  the  end,  French  mega-suppliers  were  caught  in  a  scissors  effect.  One  hand  they  were 
suffering higher fixed costs. On the other, they were in no position to increase sales prices as much 
as they wanted to. In this respect and as demonstrated by Figure 6, their situation was not very 
different from other leading global suppliers. 





















































Source: Frigant, 2009 
Note the clear difference in Faurecia and Valeo’s performances (see Figure 7). This is because 
Valeo’s three years of losses corresponded to a period when the automotive business was suffering French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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overall. Conversely, Faurecia lack of profitability seems to have been structural in nature, with the 
company having lost money for eight of the past 13 years. In our opinion, there are two explanations 
for this difference.  
Firstly,  Faurecia  pursued  a  major  external  growth  strategy  that  increased  its  debt  levels, 
causing a considerable rise in interest charges over the period (see Figure 1). 
Secondly, the two companies differed greatly in shareholding terms. Faurecia remained under 
the control of PSA Peugeot-Citroën, which is itself under family control. Valeo, on the other hand, is 
under  pressure  from  the  financial  community,  specifically  the  Pardus  investment  fund.  In  2007, 
Pardus  took  a  10.57%  equity  stake  in  Valeo  and  increased  pressure  by  demanding  greater 
profitability. It forced Valeo to disengage from peripheral activities and reduce R&D spending. For a 
while,  it  even  considered  forcing  the  company  to  merger  with  US  mega-supplier  Visteon  (also 
controlled by Pardus). Indeed, for most of the late 2000s, recurring conflicts between the group 
executive  run  by  T.  Morin  (who  wanted  to  prioritise  industrial  development)  and  Pardus  was 
headline news at Valeo. Despite certain concessions that T. Morin was able to wrangle (including the 
sale of Valeo’s cables activities to Leoni in 2007), he ultimately had to resign on 23 March 2009 
because of a divergence of opinion with the Board of Directors, which criticised him for not having 
sufficiently refocused on the group’s core business. Still, looking at figures 7 and 6, it is not at all clear 
that T. Morin did anything wrong in this respect. 
Although  there  is  less to be  said  about  Plastic  Omnium,  the  fact  remains that  this  is  the 
supplier that performed relatively best over the past seven years. Like with Valeo, it is the sudden fall 
in volumes that explains its 2008 losses. The adaptation measures implemented in 2009 enabled 
Plastic Omnium to already return to profitability that year, something that relatively few other global 
equipment suppliers were able to do. In shareholding terms, like Faurecia Plastic Omnium was under 
indirect  family  control,  with  the  majority  of  shares  held  by  the  Burelle  SA  holding  company, 
controlled in turn by the Burelle family (which according to the 2010 Burelle SA annual report had an 
equity stake of 77.1% and 90.4% of all voting rights). The holding company said that its aimed to 
pursue “a long-term strategy of building subsidiaries”. In this instance, the announced policy seemed 
to correspond to reality. 














Source: author from enterprise annual reports French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
 
18
5. Commercial and productive internationalisation  
It would have been impossible for the mega-suppliers to develop to the same extent within a 
narrow framework defined by national borders. Thus, their development was also a question of 
internationalisation. This topic can be broached from two angles: commercial internationalisation; 
and productive internationalisation.  
5.1. Commercial internationalisation  
The  mega-suppliers’  growth  required  growth  in  their  market  spaces.  These  were  firms 
committed to internationalisation trajectories for two main reasons. 
The first involved their following traditional customers abroad. Carmakers were also starting 
to develop their markets by building new plants in target spaces. This internationalisation was largely 
based on a reduction in the number of platforms – a policy aimed at increasing the number of 
components shared between different models built using one and the same platform (Lung et al, 
1999). One consequence of this platform approach was to encourage reliance on global sourcing, 
which involves turning to one and the same supplier and making this party responsible for delivering 
the same component to all of a company’s sites worldwide. Since export is not always feasible (for 
reasons of productive coordination or due to entry barriers such as customs duties and/or local 
contents ratios), mega-suppliers had to duplicate their production sites. Such follow sourcing may 
have  been  one  of  the  causes  of  productive  internationalisation  but  it  also  explains  the 
internationalisation of sales. 
The second mechanism was the conquest of new markets. Mega-suppliers would more or less 
attack markets that they considered useful. Clearly, this was a recursive interaction, in the sense that 
the arrival of a new competitor X on Y’s domestic space would increase the latter’s vulnerability and 
cause it, in response, to set up its own operations in the new country (possibly X’s home country). By 
narrowing the domestic market and (conversely) by developing sales abroad, this would lead to a 
major reduction in each large supplier’s proportion of domestic sales - to such an extent that mega-
suppliers  began  to  disseminate  less  and  less  information  about  national  sales.  This  is  because 
henceforth,  most  were  starting  to  reason  on  a  macro-regional  scale.  Like  carmakers  whose 
internationalisation  was  organised  among  integrated  regional  zones  (Carrillo,  Lung,  van  Tulder, 
2004), mega-suppliers began to apprehend their different markets on a similar scale. It remains that 
performances continued to vary markedly 
Taking a snapshot, French module suppliers apparently remained relatively focused on their 
domestic zone (i.e. Europe). Comparing their international rate with the average for the 24 largest 
global suppliers in 2009, French numbers were quite a bit lower (Figure 8). Plastic Omnium, which 
made 40% of its automotive sales outside of Europe, is the supplier that depended least on its 
domestic zone. Faurecia only made 27% of its sales outside of Europe. At the same time, these two 
suppliers did double their internationalisation rates between 1999 and 2009. Valeo, on the other 
hand, started with a high level of internationalisation (38%) but fell back over the period in question 
to the point that its figures fell clearly below those of its counterparts elsewhere in the world. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Note: TOP24 is a panel of the biggest suppliers in 2009 who appear also in the Automotive News ranking in 
1999. 
Source: Author from Automotive News 
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Note: TOP24 is a panel of the biggest suppliers in 2009 who appear also in the Automotive News ranking in 
1999. 
Source: Author from Automotive News 
Figure 9’s horizontal axis shows the rise in ex-Europe sales. Its vertical axis replicates the 
internationalisation rate in 2009. Faurecia and Plastic Omnium experienced spectacular growth in 
non-European sales, explaining the latter’s higher internationalisation rate. With respect to Faurecia, 
the  very  strong  expansion  in  its  European  sales  (notably  in  Germany)  mechanically  limited  any 
growth in its internationalisation rate. Valeo is between the two. In value terms, it experienced clear French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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growth in ex-European sales (28%) but given even faster growth withinn Europe, the company’s 
internationalisation rate fell by two points. 
All in all, the three French module suppliers still seemed relatively focused on their domestic 
market in 2009, despite strong progress by Plastic Omnuim and Faurecia in absolute and relative 
value. Valeo, and the other hand, had not advanced as far with its international process, despite this 
strategy’s dominance among leading global module suppliers.  
5.2. Productive internationalisation  
It is difficult to dissociate the issue of suppliers’ productive internationalisation from questions 
relating  to  location.  Over  the  past  few  years,  knowledge  about  automotive  industry  location 
mechanisms has improved notably. Accelerating geographic mutations have sparked interest from 
many researchers (economists, geographers etc,) and a significant accumulation of empirical material 
about both carmakers and suppliers. Focusing on literature concerning the latter group, three main 
families co-exist.  
A first corpus attempts to analyse mega-suppliers’ localisation behavior. What has been noted 
here is that internationalisation tends to pursue a triple objective: follow sourcing; penetration of 
new markets; and delocalisation (Frigant, 2007). The latter relates to the international fragmentation 
of  production  processes,  something  observed  in  several  sectors  (Berger,  2005)  but  featuring  a 
number of specificities where the automobile is concerned, due to the burdensome coordination 
constraints weighing on certain kinds production (Frigant, Layan, 2009; Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, 
Gereffi,  2008).  Notwithstanding  this,  a  fragmentation  logic  does  exist  and  continues  despite 
everything to contribute to the expansion of production capacities in the world’s more peripheral 
spaces. As aforementioned, this is partially an objective imposed by the carmakers themselves.  
One effect of these delocalisations has been the rapid creation of production capacities in low-
cost countries in line with a regional integration logic. Each major automobile manufacturing zone is 
surrounded by a periphery housing particular types of activity. This schema can be found in North 
America,  where  Mexico  plays  a  supporting  role  for  the  production  of  components  (Contreras, 
Carrillo, Estrada, 2010). In Europe, countries from Eastern Europe – especially Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (Pavlínek, Domanski, Guzik, 2009; Domanski, Gwosdz, 2009) – along with North 
Africa and Turkey (Layan, Lung, 2009) play a similar role. Research demonstrates that within an 
international division of labour framework, such countries become production centres for certain 
elements – although there is also some local production aimed at supplying domestic carmakers’ 
local sites.  
A  third  body  of  research  starts  with  the  outlook  in  the  historic  automobile  production 
countries.  Such  studies  converge  to  describe  a  restructuring  process that  has  culminated  in  the 
closure of entities producing certain elements that were generally (but not only) relocated towards 
the periphery, along with other activities that remained embedded in their original spaces (Klier, 
Rubenstein,  2008;  Rutherford,  Holmes,  2008;  Jürgens,  Krzywdzinski,  2009).  Here  again,  mega-
suppliers were particularly active in this geographic restructuring trend.  
All in all, literature on changing supply chain geography has converged around three main 
ideas. 
￿  The geography of supply chains has evolved rapidly and deeply based on an international 
division  of  labour  logic  that  mega-suppliers  often  organise  as  international  division  of 
productive processes.  French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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￿  One logical consequence is that companies arbitrate between different activities. We are not 
witnessing a generalised process of deindustrialisation but a selective process that could lead 
to certain activities being reinforced in core countries. 
￿  This process is complex to dissect due to the fact that countries hosting the production of 
certain  vehicle  elements may  also  be vehicle  production  locations.  Certain elements  are 
produced  in  peripheral  countries  not  to  cut  production  costs  but  because  cognitive  or 
productive coordination constraints must be respected. 
The combination of these different mechanisms has expanded the number of locations where 
global  mega-suppliers  run  operations.  This  explains  the  vast  network  of  entities  that  they  have 
established across the world (Table 4). 
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und.  und.  58  und.  und.  6 
ArvinMeritor  28  142  121  46 (NA)  und.  21  6 (NA)  und. 
Autoliv  28  103  80  6  74  20  2  18 
Bosch  und.  > 350  270 est.  60 est.  und.  und.  und.  und. 
Bridgestone  25  180  165  58  107  15  4  11 
Continental  und.  159  137  48  89  22  6  16 
Dana  28  121  110  65 (NA)  und.  11  10 (NA)  und. 
Delphi  36  300  159  und.  und.  und.  und.  und. 
Denso  32  197  143  48  95  26  19  7 
Faurecia  25  232  171  37  134  25  12  13 
Freudenberg  53  398  214  30  184  und.  und.  und. 
GKN  >30  222  132  9  123  18  6  12 
Johnson Controls  und.  191  170  48  122  14  10  4 
Lear  33  265  215  und.  und.  46  und.  und. 
Magna  und.  291  229  62  167  62  8  54 
Michelin  19  80  69  15  54  5  1  4 
TRW  26  211  147  41 (NA)  und.  19  7 (NA)  und. 
Valeo  29  206  129  56 (EO)  und.  68  42 (EO)  und. 
Visteon  29  206  87  15  72  und.  und.  und. 
ZF Fried.  25  158  95  28  67  6  und.  und. 
Note: EO: Western Europe. NA: North America. und: undetermined 
The table is built along the following lines (sources: Website/10-k form/Anual Report):  
- Column 2 & 3: Company statements.  
- Column 4-Manufacturing: survey of sites by author, except where the firm has provided a summarize table.  
- Column 5 (R&D, design, Technical centers): same compilation principles as Manufacturing uses. The data here 
has  been  aggregated  since  firms  have  various  ways  of  accounting  for  these  three  types  of  sites.  When  a 
production and a R&D site are associated, they are only accounted for once, as a production site. 
Source: Frigant, 2009 
Qualitative analysis of these entities has identified five types (Frigant, Layan, 2009): 
· Core R&D centres that perform an autonomous research and development activity on all 
carmakers’ behalf (in the sense that the activity is not dedicated to any particular make).  
· R&D centres located in carmakers’ vicinity. These are often twinned with commercial offices 
and tend to be developed to a greater or lesser extent depending on the suppliers and 
carmakers in question.  French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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· Just-in-time or ILS (in-line-sequence) production centres making dedicated modules for one 
particular carmaker. These tend to be located in supplier parks (Larsson, 2002). 
· Production  centres  delocalised  to  low-cost  countries  and  responsible  for  output 
manufactured on a broad scale and generally requiring an abundant workforce. 
· Plants located in the main automobile production countries (regardless of the location, i.e. 
including developing and emerging economies) and given responsibility for production 
that is either highly technical in nature or conducive to economies of scale.  
The three French modular suppliers studied in this text have followed a similar logic. 
5.2.1. Faurecia 
Faurecia  began  its  productive  internationalisation  relatively  belatedly,  with  France  having 
remained key to its production system for a long time – something that has changed markedly in 
recent years (see staff numbers, Table 5). This decline is not only relative in nature, with Faurecia 
having eliminated nearly 10,000 jobs in France since its 2003 peak when the firm employed 24,966 
persons there (vs. 14,663 in 2010). Germany was the first country where Faurecia pushed hard to 
grow its activities. Moreover, it has been largely protected from the current wave of geographic 
restructuring since it still employed 11,283 persons in Germany in 2010, a figure that has been very 
stable since major acquisitions made in 2000 (with German staff members amounting to 5,784 in 
1999, 10,958 in 2001 and peaking at 11,355 in 2002).  
Table 5 – Employees of Faurecia 
  2002  2005  2010 
  Units  %  Units  %  Units  % 
Europe  51,663  87.7%  49,497  80.2%  49,967  66.0% 
of which             
France  24,628  41.8%  22,148  35.9%  14,663  19.4% 
Germany  11,355  19.3%  10,050  16.3%  11,283  14.9% 
North America  4,958  8.4%  6,958  11.3%  12,571  16.6% 
South America  1,192  2.0%  1,924  3.1%  4,770  6.3% 
Asia  153  0.3%  2,068  3.4%  6,598  8.7% 
Other countries  912  1.5%  1,275  2.1%  1,770  2.3% 
Total  58,878  100.0%  61,722  100.0%  75,676  100.0% 
Source: Author from Faurecia annual reports 
Table 6 – Main customers of Faurecia (% of sales) 
  2000  2005  2010 
PSA  24.7  26  18.2 
VW (Group)  24.8  22  24.3 
Renault-Nissan  15  14  11.9 
Ford (Group)  12.4  10  11 
GM (Group)  6.7  8  9.8 
Daimler (Chrysler)  5.5  8  4.3 
BMW  4  6  9.2 
Toyota  0.9  2  1.7 
Hyundai/Kia  nc  1  1.1 
Fiat Chrysler  -  -  3.7 
Autres  6.0  3  4.8 
Source: author from Faurecia annual reports 
The  displacement  of  Faurecia’s  centre  of  gravity  towards  Germany  translates  a  common 
feature of these mega-suppliers, to wit, the need to gain proximity to customers (with Volkswagen French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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having  become  Faurecia’s  number  one  client  and  French  carmakers  declining,  Table  6).  This  is 
because cognitive and productive coordination needs remain strong in this industry - as do the forces 
of agglomeration/clustering.  
It also explains why Faurecia’s global staff figures are characterised by much higher numbers in 
North America where the group has tried to gain proximity to US carmakers (mainly via acquisitions, 
as  aforementioned)  and  more  recently  in  Asia  (first  and  foremost,  China).  Like  many  Western 
carmakers, China is increasingly perceived as a strategic priority for many suppliers. Faurecia is totally 
committed to this strategy and whereas it only employed 153 people in Asia in 2002, it now has 
6,598  employees.  Note  that  in  2011,  Faurecia  was  running  18  production  plants  in  China,  one 
research and development centre in Minbei and one commercial office in Shangai. 
One of Faurecia’s attributes is that it has made relatively lesser use of delocalisation as a 
strategy,  meaning  that  its  productive  apparatus  seems  to  have  remained  relatively  focused  on 
developing countries. For instance, Faurecia has 20 production plants in North America, five R&D 
centres,  one  commercial  office  in  the  USA  (plus  one  production  plant  in  Canada)  but  “only”  9 
production plants in Mexico. In the same way, Faurecia has only one production plant in Morocco 
and one in Tunisia (2011 data).  
Map 1 - The location of new Faurecia plants (2002–2006) or closed plants (2002–2005) in Europe 
 
Note: Faurecia opened another components plant in Romania after acquisition of a local supplier in 2006. It is 
not shown on the map as we could not find its exact coordinates. 
Source: Frigant, Layan, 2009 French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Faurecia’s internationalisation strategy is not particularly focused on the search for low-cost 
production sites per se. The supplier is trying to combines several objectives in its expansion policy. 
This  explains  why  it  expanded  so  rapidly  in  Eastern  Europe.  Map  1  shows  Faurecia’s  relocation 
strategy  over  2002-2006.  Its  priority  was  to  open  production  plants  in  Eastern  Europe  to  make 
components there that would feed into the group’s other factories. Conversely, equivalent factories 
in Western Europe tended to be closed or sold off. Alongside of this, Faurecia would open factories in 
both parts of Europe capable of delivering to carmakers just-in-time (proximity constraint). The net 
effect  of  these  moves  exemplifies  a  strategy  that  consisted  of  combining  delocalisation  with 
responsiveness  to  productive  and  cognitive  constraints,  thereby  constructing  a  coherent  spatial 
international  division  of  productive  sites  model  on  a  scale  appropriate  for  a  multinational  firm 
(Frigant, Layan, 2009). 
5.2.2. Valeo 
Valeo’s productive internationalisation came earlier than Faurecia’s. As far back as 1995, the 
supplier was already saying that 47% of its employees worked outside of France – a figure that has 
fallen to 25% at present. One thing that Valeo does have in common with Faurecia is the diminishing 
importance of France, translating an absolute fall in the number of domestic jobs it offers in this 
country, after eliminating 10,758 positions here between 2000 and 2010 (table 7). 
For a long time, Valeo’s localisation trajectory seemed to differ from Faurecia’s. This is because 
Valeo  began  very  early  on  to  engage  in  a  significant  delocalisation  trend  involving  North  Africa 
(Morocco and Tunisia). In 2002, 11.1% of all group employees worked in the Africa zone (including a 
few activities run out of South Africa). The group’s overall geography suddenly changed in 2007, 
however, when it sold its cables activities to Leoni. This is because many of Valeo’s delocalised 
wiring-related  activities  were  very-labour  intensive.  By  selling  these  sites,  the  group’s  centre  of 
gravity automatically shifted towards the developing world, to the point that its geography is closer 
now to its French counterparts, combining: 
· Production sites located in low-cost countries. These are relatively few in number but they do 
employ many staff members (Table 7). Like Faurecia, Valeo has turned to Eastern Europe where 
it  can  satisfy  several  objectives  at  once  (proximity  to  European  industrial  centres  and  low 
production costs).  
· Production plants located in developed or emerging countries. The function of some of these 
units  is  to  deliver  customers  on  a  just-in-time  basis.  In  parallel,  some  highly  sophisticated 
production remains located in developed countries - one example being the Start-stop system 
that continues to be manufactured in French plants. 
· R&D  centres  and  offices  located  to  follow  in  carmakers’  footsteps.  Note  that  in  a  context 
characterised by a reduction in the group’s overall size, the number of research or development 
centres has increased, rising from 54 in 2002 to 58 in 2011. This is because Valeo considers that it 
must operate in carmakers’ immediate vicinity to improve its understanding of (and response to) 
customers’ specific local demands (G. Devauchelle, Valeo Director for R&D). French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Table 7 – Employees of Valeo  
  2002  2010 
  Units  %  Units  % 
Western Europe  40,700  58.9%  24,200  41.8% 
Of which France  23,600  34.2%  14,440  24.9% 
EasternEurope  4,800  6.9%  9,592  16.6% 
North America  9,600  13.9%  6,212  10.7% 
South America  2,700  3.9%  4,383  7.6% 
Asia  3,600  5.2%  12,115  20.9% 
Africa  7,700  11.1%  1,428  2.5% 
Total  69,100  100.0%  57,930  100.0% 
Source: Author from Valeo annual reports 
Table 8 – Locations of Valeo in 2002 and 2011 
  As of 31 march 2011  As of 31 december 2002 
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40,700  73  39  6 
Total  29  60,900  109  58  10  25  69,100  140  54  9 
Source: Author from Valeo website 
 
6.2.3. Plastic Omnium 
It  is  almost  impossible  to  compare  Plastic  Omnium  to  its  counterparts,  given  -  as 
aforementioned – that this company has only recently embarked upon a growth trajectory. For the 
moment, Plastic Omnium remains strongly embedded in Europe, where 60% of its employees work. 
France accounts for about one-half of this number. Moreover, unlike Faurecia and Valeo, Plastic 
Omnium, is still recruiting in France (Figure 10). Even so, temporary jobs account for 13.9% of its total 
French employees (versus a global average of 12.6%, with a maximum temp rate of 15.2% in a very 
vast zone that it calls “Asia & South America”). French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Note: “Asia & South America” is including Turkey and South Africa 
Source: author from Plastic Omnium Financial Report 
Table 9 – Locations of Plastic Omnium (automobile division, 2011) 
    Production plants  RD Centers 
Belgium  2  1 
France  13  3 
Germany  4  1 
Spain  8  0 
United Kingdom  2  1 
Western Europe 
Western Europe  29  6 
Czech Republic  1  0 
Romania  1  0 
Poland  1  0 
Russia  1  0 
Slovakia  3  1 
Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe  7  1 
Canada  1  0 
USA  5  2 
Mexico  8  0 
North America 
North America  14  2 
Argentina  2  0 
Brazil  2  0  South America 
South America  4  0 
South Africa  1  0 
Turkey  1  0  Africa + Turkey 
Africa + Turkey  2  0 
China  12  1 
India  3  0 
South Korea  5  1 
Japan  1  1 
Thailand  1  0 
Asia 
Asia  22  3 
Total    78  12 
Note: Plastic Omnium declares 77 plants but PO seems to forget Turkey 
Source: author from Plastic Omnium website French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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Study  of  Plastic  Omnium’s  productive  apparatus  (summarized  in  Table  10)  shows  that  it 
develops a localisation strategy based on proximity customers. This is because Plastic Omnium’s 
output imposes his cognitive and productive proximity constraints. Note, however, that the presence 
of eight factories in Mexico suggests that Plastic Omnium also intends to control production costs 
and is fully aware of the possibilities offered by delocalisation strategies. It remains that globally 
there is a relatively clear correlation between the map of the main locations of Plastic Omnium’s 
leading automotive customers (Table 10) and the map of its own production locations. 
Table 10 – Automobile’s clients of Plastic Omnium 2010 
  Sales (k€)  % 
PSA Peugeot Citroen  483,063  17.4% 
Renault/Nissan  368,622  13.3% 
General Motors  478,807  17.2% 
BMW  382,155  13.8% 
Volkswagen  337,839  12.2% 
Others  727,561  26.2% 
Total Automobile  2,778,047  100% 
Source: Plastic Omnium Financial Report, 2010 
Conclusion 
The past 20 years have witnessed major upheavals in the automotive supplies industry. The 
construction of a supply chain characterised by a pyramid organisation has specifically led to the 
creation of first tier suppliers that many of us have come to qualify as mega-suppliers. When we 
reconstruct French mega-suppliers’ trajectory, what becomes clear is that their initial growth were 
the result of conscious decisions made by France’s domestic carmakers. At the same time, from the 
late 1990s onwards, the very same carmakers were no longer looking to spawn new actors – a 
change in behavior that caused consolidation on a national basis and culminated in fewer French 
mega-suppliers figuring among the world’s top 100
8. Among those who did survive, module suppliers 
are useful to study since their growth derived directly from the structural transformations that had 
accompanied carmakers’ externalisation.  
We  have  demonstrated  that  the  suppliers  in  question  based much of  their growth on  an 
aggressive M&A policy. Even so, due to a significant rise in fixed costs, this growth did not necessarily 
translate into profitability. Contrary to the predictions of certain modularity studies, market power 
has not developed in a way that benefits the mega-suppliers suffering from rising fixed costs. In 
response,  these  actors  have  squeezed  employees’  working  conditions  (patterns  of  labour  and 
precariousness) and engaged in rapid delocalisation and internationalisation. Despite this, a number 
of proximity constraints still remain. Ultimately, these are productive networks that can be described 
as networks of factories and R&D centres geared towards (hence detetermined by) suppliers’ main 
automobile customers. Note that French module suppliers seem to have increasingly organised their 
European productive apparatus in a way that centres on Eastern Europe. By so doing, they are 
seemingly falling in line with their German competitors who have put together a veritable East-West 
sourcing system by building factories in Eastern Europe and relying heavily on subcontractors coming 
from these countries (Jürgens, Blöcker, Hildermeier, 2010). 
From an analytical perspective, the French example demonstrates that changes in industrial 
architecture reflect interactions between four elements. Firstly, there is carmakers’ strategic desire 
                                                      
8 Nevertheless, they continue to cater to tier 2 suppliers on an ad hoc basis. During the 2008/09 crisis, France ‘s carmakers took part in the 
creation (and co-funding) of a state-managed relief fund benefiting equipment suppliers. This fund, which has been renewed despite the 
“end of the crisis”, takes equity stakes in allegedly strategic suppliers to help them survive. French mega-suppliers’ trajectories during the modular era … 
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to  disintegrate  vertically.  Secondly,  there  is  the  role  that  they  have  played  in  structuring  their 
suppliers fabric - with French carmakers moving in the late 1980s to select the future winners from 
their externalisation drives but doing the exact opposite in the late 1990s when they disengaged 
from the market and let it follow its own direction. This is quite different from their German or 
Japanese counterparts, which might explain why cumulative forces soon gained the upper hand to 
benefit suppliers who were in a position to reinforce their existing positions and impede the arrival of 
credible new rivals. Thirdly, the pyramid structure required a modification in the object of exchange, 
given that components were now being aggregated. This is a function that modularity has performing 
by enabling the constitution of macro-components for which mega-modular suppliers have assumed 
responsibility. Lastly, such mega-suppliers became very proactive in the sense that they were not 
passive subjects of modularity or of supply chain transformations. Quite the contrary, to structure 
the supply of modules they engaged in major R&D spending programmes, working imaginatively and 
proactively to propel this modularity trend. The direct consequence of this succession of events has 
been to limit the number of the happy few and encourage a tightening of the sector’s supply pyramid 
- a trend that has tended to generalise on a global scale given suppliers’ engagement, alongside 
carmakers, in major internationalisation drives. 
It  remains  that  this  co-evolution  in  carmaker  and  mega-supplier  strategies  might  well  be 
questioned in the future. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the renewal of technologies - and 
notably the advent of electric vehicles - could reshuffle the deck. In the past, the development of 
modules helped to rearrange equipment suppliers’ structure and it is possible that new entrants will 
arise  in  time,  with  today’s  well-established  firms  finding  it  difficult  to  adapt.  Secondly,  some 
carmakers  have  started  asking  questions  about  the  excesses  of  externalization  (Parry,  Roehrich, 
2009;  Zirpoli,  Becker,  2010;  Frigant,  In  Press).  Issues  such  as  reliability  (of  products  but  also  of 
increasingly fragmented supply chains) or control over product-related competencies have raised 
doubts about certain choices. Lastly, the great unknown is the state of equipment suppliers from 
emerging  countries.  For  the  moment,  people  tend  to  talk  about  the  rise  of  Indian  or  Chinese 
carmakers  but  possess  very  little  information  about  suppliers  originating  in  these  countries.  Yet 
historically, every time a national carmaker has developed, it has carried national suppliers in the 
wake. We already know that domestic capacities are expanding in China (Herrigel, 2011) but cannot 
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